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Abstract 
I maintain that fatalistic tendencies are the output of the interaction between cultural factors (and in 
particular of religious beliefs) and  historical Institutional experience.  Using WVS data this idea 
has been tested against two well known sociological theories on the origin of fatalism: Weberian 
cosmological fatalism and Durkheim‘s structural fatalism.   The data supports the Durkheimian idea 
that a more regulated society tends to be also more fatalistic. Also the direct effect of religion on 
fatalistic beliefs seem to be an important element determining fatalistic tendencies. However  there 
are not large differences across the various faiths. In other terms, being religious independently 
from the religious affiliation implies a more fatalistic view of life. 
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 1. Introduction 
Fatalism has been shown to  play a significant role in determining a vast range of individual 
behaviors including saving decisions, occupational choices, health screening behaviors, natural 
disaster preparedness. For fatalism I intend people‘s propensity to believe that their destinies are 
ruled by an unseen power, Fate, rather than by their will.  
The concept of fatalism is akin to that of locus of control developed in psychology. In particular 
locus of control refers to a person's belief about what causes the good or bad results in his or her 
life, either in general or in a specific area (Rotter, 1966; 1990). People‘s locus of control can be 
either internal or external, depending on whether or not they tend to believe that their actions 
ultimately determine personal outcomes.  
The distinction between psychological traits and culturally based prior beliefs is not neat. Indeed, it 
is not a scope of this work to deeply discuss the ample literature in psychology and anthropology on 
the subject: building on latter contributions, my contention is that cultural beliefs pertain to the 
social sphere, i.e. cultural beliefs are a social construct, whereas psychological traits belong the 
individual sphere (Church, 2000). The latter are originated from genetic inheritance and individual 
experiences, and encompass also values that are for a large part shaped by cultural influences. In 
contrast, culture is restricted to collective, often normative, ―mental programs‖. 
It is surprising that a belief so important in characterizing people‘s expectations concerning the link 
between actions and results has  received so little attention in economic literature.  Among the few 
economists who have analyzed the role of fatalism in economic decision, Alesina and Angeletos 
(2005) show how a system with more (less) redistribution can arise when individuals are less 
(more) likely to believe that effort determines income. On the same line, Benabou and Tirole (2006) 
relate fatalism to the psychology literature and the notion of a ―belief in a just world‖ (Lerner 1982) 
in order to examine the interaction between ideology and redistribution systems. Wu (2005) 
analyzes the role of fatalism in determining household savings behavior, finding that people 
characterized by fatalistic beliefs are less likely to save. Wu(2005), Shapiro and Wu (2010) show 
that fatalism decreases savings for moderately risk averse individuals, but actually increases savings 
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for highly risk averse individuals. Furthermore, fatalism decreases the effort in learning about 
savings and investment options. 
 D‘orlando, Ferrante and Ruiu (2011) argue that the negative psychological impact of  
unemployment episodes is particularly severe for fatalistic people, who think that they cannot do 
anything to change their situations. Therefore, people characterized by fatalistic tendencies, would 
prefer employment protection legislation which reduces unemployment episodes (even if it 
increases the duration of unemployment) rather than unemployment benefits which compensate 
only the monetary but not the psychological costs of unemployment. Thus the varying impacts of 
these psychological costs on workers characterized by different degrees of fatalism can explain the 
different choices made by different countries. 
Ruiu (2012) argues that fatalistic beliefs may represent an important cultural barrier for 
entrepreneurship.  
There is strong evidence in the medical literature on the role of fatalism in health screening 
behavior (Straughan and Seow 1998, Nelson et al. 2002, Niederdeppe and Gurmankin Levy 2007).
1
 
There exist various studies in clinical psychology showing that fatalism significantly impact both 
the preparedness of individuals to announced natural disasters, i.e., fatalism obstacles the adoption 
of self-protecting behavior,  and the ability to cope with the psychological consequence of natural 
disaster, i.e., fatalism amplifies the post traumatic stress suffered by the victims of   such disasters 
(Perilla et al.,2002; McClure, Allen and Walkey,1999, 2001; McClure et al., 2007).  
All these evidences indicate that a better understanding of the causes of fatalistic beliefs formation 
may be of crucial importance for a policy maker.  
The aim of this paper is to answer to the following questions: why do some populations are more 
fatalistic than others ? Where does fatalism come from?  
To my knowledge only in Sociology there have been attempts to explain the origin of fatalistic 
tendencies (Durkheim, 1897; Weber, 1930, Acevedo, 2005) while economists have completely 
neglected this subject of research.  
Following Thomas and Mueller (2000) and D‘Orlando, Ferrante and Ruiu (2011) and Acevedo 
(2005) I maintain that fatalism is at least partly culturally determined and in this paper, I will give 
some empirical evidence supporting this view. In particular, I show that fatalism is strongly tied 
with adhering to a religious faith (independently from which faith) .  
The paper is divided in four sections . In  section 2, I will  clarify what is intended for culture. In 
section 3, I will clarify the notion of fatalism. In the latter section, after a review of the main 
sociological theories on the origin of fatalism, I will propose a possible answer to the research 
questions reported above.  In  section 4, I will show some empirical analysis supporting the view 
that fatalism depends at least partly on cultural legacy. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Definition of culture 
The first step for talking about the role played by culture in determining fatalism, is to identify 
culture in a sufficiently narrow way, so that it become possible to investigate the causal link from 
culture to fatalistic beliefs. Among others two well known definitions of culture have been proposed 
by Hofstede (1991) and Guiso et al. (2006). In particular Hofstede defines culture as: ―the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from 
another‖ (1991,p.5). Guiso et al.‗s definition is focused on the transmission of cultural values: ―we 
define culture as those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups 
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation‖ (2006, p.23) . Putting together these 
definitions it is possible to stress the salient characteristics of culture:  
I) culture is a collective not individual attribute;  
II) is not directly visible but manifested through behaviors;  
III) common to some but not to all people;  
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 In particular, Nelson et al. (2002) showed that fatalism, viewed as a cultural belief closely bound up with ethnical 
origin, is associated with delays in seeking health care. 
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IV) is slow moving being an inheritance that fathers  leave to sons. 
According to Hofstede culture is not tangible and largely unobservable as it can only be studied 
through various verbal and nonverbal manifestations values, heroes, rituals, and symbols which 
influence behavior.    
Values are the core of the definition of culture and represent the most deeply embedded 
manifestation of culture. According to Hofstede (1980, p.18) a value can be defined as: ― a broad 
tendency to prefer certain state of affairs over others‖.  The values shape the identity of group of 
individuals or more generally of countries and thus cultures can be compared with each other using 
values as a standard. Some well known cultural dimensions and some associated values are 
described in Table 1. The definitions of heroes, rituals, and symbols are given in Table 2.  
The above mentioned characteristic I, is fundamental to distinguish culture from personality. There 
is an ongoing debate among psychologists to what extent culture and personality can be considered 
independent and distinct variables, and to what extent they are mutually constitutive .  
In this work, I will follow Church (2000) maintaining that while personality pertains to the 
individual sphere, culture pertains to the social sphere, i.e. culturally based beliefs are a social 
construct, whereas psychological traits belong to the individual ambit . In particular, Church argues 
that mental programming is partly unique for individuals and partly shared with those who belong 
to the same culture.
2
 
Verheul et al. (2002) use the above mentioned characteristic II to distinguish culture from 
institutions, that is, culture is unobservable while institutions are observable.  
Even if  I agree on the non tangibility of culture, it‘s my opinion that this distinction  represents a 
smart way to elude the debate on what institutions and culture are and which of these factors 
influences the other rather than a clear way to distinguish between these two factors.  
A well known definition of institutions can be found in North (1994). In particular, according to 
North, Institutions are: 
―[…]the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.  They are made up of formal 
constraints (e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, 
conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics.  Together they 
define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.‖ (1994,p.360). 
Economists  often define culture as the social norms and the individual beliefs that sustain Nash 
equilibria as focal points in repeated social interactions (e.g., Schotter, 1981; Myerson, 1991; Greif, 
1994). Hence considering both this interpretation of culture and North‘s definition of institutions 
one may conclude that culture is one aspect of broadly defined institutions. However, this 
interpretation is clearly conflicting with Hofstede who considers values as a manifestation of culture 
and hence as implication culture as determinant of the institutional settings.
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Hence for Hofstede, culture shapes institutions and the latter reinforce the former being a sort of 
instrument to promote culture. According to Roland (2004) culture tends to be more slow-moving 
than political or legal institutions. Therefore, one can argue that culture might have an important 
effect on the choice of political and legal institutions itself. Among economists Guiso et al. 
(2003,2006,2009) share this view sustaining that cultural values and beliefs are the outcome of a 
process of cultural sedimentation taking place over very long time spans. 
As such, they are very stable and they may show high resilience in the face of both external, e.g. 
military invasions, immigration, or internal shocks, e.g. radical political reforms (Schwartz, Bardi, 
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 The following statement is useful to clarify the different level of analysis between personality and culture: 
―In studying personality, we compare individuals; in studying culture, we compare societies, even if our data have 
partly been collected from individuals within those societies. Individuals are to societies as trees are to forests; 
comparing forests is not comparing trees writ large…[ C]omparing forests involves quite different elements: not only 
the configurations of different trees but also the entire biotope‖ (Hofstede and McCrae, 2004, p.65). 
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 In particular, he sustains that:  
 “the stability of cultural patterns can be ascribed to reinforcement by the institutions which themselves are products of 
the dominant value systems” (1980, p. 233). 
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and Bianchi 2000; Inglehart and Baker, 2000). Of course, older cultures (South European, Chinese, 
Arab), will displaymore resilience relative to new ones (Australia, USA). This explains why the 
former cultures appear more conservative, less dynamic  and more prone to oppose institutional 
innovations.  
Tabellini (2010) argues that the game theorist‘s view of culture and that of cultural psychologist are 
not mutually exclusive but can complement each other. He sustains that culture is an important 
channel through which historical institutions influence current institutions. In particular he shows 
that historical institutions are correlated with current cultural values which in turns determine how 
current institutions work and hence influence current economic development. 
  
»»»»  Insert Table 1 here, now at the end «««« 
 
On the same line of research Gorodnichenko and Roland (2010) show that culture continues to play 
a statistically significant and quantitatively important role in determining long-run growth even 
after controlling for measures of institutions, implying that culture has an effect on economic 
development that is independent of institutions. Furthermore, they find that there is a two-way 
causality between culture and institutions thus suggesting that institutions are in part determined by 
culture. D‘orlando, Ferrante and Ruiu (2011) show that two cultural prior beliefs as trust and 
fatalism are very persistent through time. 
Given the above mentioned evidences, in this work I will adopt the view according to which culture 
is not a simple coordination device adopted by economic players but a system of value transmitted 
from one generation to the next and hence able to shape people‘s attitude and beliefs.   
 
»»»»  Insert Table 2 here, now at the end«««« 
 
3.  Fate and fatalism: Definition and possible sources 
 
“Desine fata deum flecti sperare precando.‖ Eneide  VI [Virgilio] 
 
Although the precise meaning of the word fatalism changes across cultures and religions, it can be 
linked with people‘s propensity to believe that their destinies are ruled by an unseen power – Fate – 
rather than by their will. Hence, fatalism can undermine the confidence in the link between effort 
and economic success.
4
   
The concept of fatalism has been central to the development of religious and philosophical thought. 
Of course, this is not surprising because the question of whether or not our destinies are under our 
control is at the root of our thoughts and has shaped our cultural evolution.  
Fatalism can be expected to be culturally transmitted from one generation to the next. But there are 
differences regarding how fatalism is conceived within different cultures and religions that should 
be taken into account when investigating the role of fatalism in different societies.   
For The old Romans (who had inherited their concept of Fate from the Hellenistic culture) the 
destiny of men was assigned by 3 female Gods, Nona, Decima and Morta (the so called Parcae). 
Even the other Gods cannot rebel against the Parcae‘s decision, moreover also every God was 
subject to a mysterious willingness called Fatum (Fate). Christianity substituted this concept of Fate 
with the concept of Divine Providence, but with some difference across faiths and across regions. 
For a roman catholic, the individual is free to determine his destiny and the Divine Providence is the 
benevolent willingness of God to help the men to correct the consequences and to improve the 
awareness of their errors. However also in the catholic world there are huge differences in the view 
of the Divine Providence. For instance Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales (2006) pointed out that the vision 
of the Divine Providence is very different between North and South Italy, where in the North the 
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 Tabellini (2010) showed that the confidence between actions and output is one of the cultural determinants of 
economic development.  
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concept of Divine Providence is the one given above while in the South it is very similar to the 
roman concept of Fate, the men cannot do anything to change their conditions, only pray to God. 
Another interesting case is  Calvinism.  Calvinists believe in predetermination, however as argued 
by Weber, Calvinism  takes a rationalistic and empiricist turn away from fatalism and looks to 
worldly manifestations for verification of God‘s omnipotence. It is the Calvinist belief that it 
requires ―evidence‖ of salvation leading to a remove of the fatalistic tendencies from the Calvinist 
worldview. Why don‘t this process of rationalization happen in all faiths/countries?  
According to Landes (1998) starting from the 15
th
  century  the  reaction of the Catholic Church to  
the Protestant Reform restricting the inflows of new ideas has promoted the diffusion of cultures of 
intolerance, xenophobia and close mindedness  in Southern Europe and Latin American.  This 
intolerance was responsible of the decline of Spain, Italy and Portugal and for poverty of Latin 
America. Similarly, the decline of Muslim countries after the 13
th
 is also explained by the newly 
found but long-lasting intolerance as a mean of political and religious control. 
Huntington (1993,1996) use similar argument in his ―clash of civilization‖ thesis. In particular 
proponents of Huntington‘s thesis have held firm in their conviction that the tenets of Islam and 
other traditional, non-Western belief systems (in particular they refer to the importance of the ethic 
of individual self-empowerment of western countries) implying a fatalistic view of life, negatively 
impact the collective ability of national publics to successfully engage the project of modernization 
and development.  
Intervening into the ―clash of civilization‖ debate Acevedo (2005) analyzed the two principal 
sources of fatalism that have been pointed out in sociological field: Cosmological and Structural 
fatalism. The first is the Weberian definition of fatalism, for which fatalism may result from distinct 
belief systems (laws of karma, diabolical spirits, divine predestination, stellar constellations, cycles 
of rebirth and so forth) that socialize adherents to accept specific fatalistic worldviews. The second 
is the definition of fatalism proposed by Durkheim (1897) for which fatalism may stem from 
structural conditions such as inequality or extreme over regulation. Using data from WVS and 2002 
Gallup poll of Islamic countries Acevedo finds that  Turkey—the country with the longest and most 
sustained Western influence—shows the highest levels of fatalism among Islamic countries and this 
is in evident contrast with the clash of civilization thesis. Furthermore he shows that in countries 
where Christians are a discriminated minority, they are characterized by higher fatalistic tendencies 
than Muslim inhabitants.   
Acevedo (2005) argues that a fuller understanding of fatalism does not come from abandoning 
Weber for Durkheim or vice versa, but rather from appropriating both formulations in the 
development of a multidimensional model of fatalism, where fatalism stems from  historical, 
cultural, economic and sociopolitical processes and not as a direct outcome of religious 
denomination alone.   
The importance of the historical influence on culture is recognized also by Hofstede (1994). 
In particular he traced the origin of  high power distance and the high uncertainty avoidance that 
characterize Latin countries to their belonging to the Roman empire. The Roman empire was 
characterized by the existence of a central authority in Rome, and a system of laws applicable to 
citizens anywhere. Therefore it is reasonable that centralization fostered large power distance and 
the roman  stress on laws fostered strong uncertainty avoidance. 
At the same way, the Chinese empire was characterized by high centralization but it lacked a fixed 
system of laws. Then in this case, the Chinese empire may have fostered  large power distance but 
medium to weak uncertainty avoidance.  
However in Hofstede, it is not clear what are the forces that preserve since today cultural values 
with such ancient roots. In particular he completely ignores the role that religions can play in this 
ambit. My view is fatalism is not a multidimensional concept as sustained by Acevedo but that  
some aspects of religions may interact with the institutional setting determining a persistent 
“hierarchization” of the society which is the source of fatalism.   
This idea reflects the  Eisenstadt‘s theory (1968) of  transformative potential of religions. The 
transformative potential refers to the capacity to legitimize, in religious or ideological terms, the 
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development of new motivations, activities, and institutions which were not encompassed by their 
original impulses and views. Hence if the presence of a religion with a low transformative potential 
is combined with the existence of bad institutions which in turn generate fatalistic beliefs, for 
example the existence of a rigid feudal system where the top class can systematically expropriate 
the fruits of the work of the bottom class, this will result in a society where it is very difficult to  
endogenously implement reforms because religion may prevent (and even repress) new ideas and 
where even if reform are imposed by some external force the resistance to institutional innovations 
caused by religious beliefs will imply a very slow internalization of the new institutions.  
These complementarities between religions and historical institutions can explain for instance the 
different fatalistic tendencies between Northern and Southern Italy and the particular high level of 
fatalism that characterizes  Eastern European Countries, Turkey and Japan. 
The Italian case is particularly interesting indeed although the religion and institutions are the same 
since 150 years and furthermore both northern and southern Italy have the same Latin origin, 
Southern Italy had been ruled for almost 4 centuries by a catholic monarchy with strong ties 
between ―Crown and Altar‖ which imposed a heavy taxation (from which the nobility and clergy 
were exempt) and a rigid feudal system characterized by a marked concentration of lands and of the 
powers in the hands of local nobles and of the church while northern Italian regions have 
experienced in general less lasting oppressive institutions than southern regions
5
.  
For what regards Eastern European countries, Turkey and Japan, Finer (1997) shows that Russian 
czars, Ottoman sultans and Tokugawa shogun had complete control over the military, the 
aristocracy, the religion and the bureaucracy. Their governments were characterized by low 
protection of property rights, high interventionism and low efficiency and these characteristics were 
immediate consequences of the intent of the rulers to maintain complete control over their subjects.  
Although these historical arguments seem to be reasonable, the scant attention devoted by economic 
theory to fatalism impedes to return a verdict on the origin of fatalistic tendencies. In particular 
even if there is a vast literature analyzing the effect of fatalistic tendencies (mostly in disciplines 
outside of economics), the debate on its origin has been opened only in sociology. In the following I 
will give some empirical clues on the existence of an interaction effect of  religious beliefs and 
institutional settings in determining fatalistic tendencies.   
4.1 Some empirical evidence on the cultural origin of fatalism: the stability of fatalism 
 
In this paragraph I will show some preliminary empirical evidences on the cultural origin of 
fatalistic beliefs. The analysis is conducted on World Values Survey  (WVS) data. The WVS is a 
worldwide investigation about basic values and beliefs of individuals in a large cross-section of 
countries (more than 80) conducted by the World Value Survey Association in five waves (1980, 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005). The survey contains information about demographics (sex, age, education, 
etc.), self-reported economic conditions, political preferences, values and attitudes, religion.  
Two possible measures are obtainable from WVS questions. The first is that used in the empirical 
analysis carried out by D‘Orlando et al. (2011) : ―Some people feel they have completely free 
choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on 
what happens to them. Please use this scale (1 means ―none at all‖ and 10 means ―a great deal‖) to 
indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns 
out‖. Therefore, higher values of the response correspond to lower  fatalistic tendencies.6 
In the 2005 wave, it has been introduced an even more direct question: ―Some people believe that 
individuals can decide their own destiny, while others think that it is impossible to escape a 
predetermined fate. Please tell me which comes closest to your view on this scale on which 1 means 
―everything in life is determined by fate‖ and 10 means that ―people shape their fate themselves.‖―. 
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Tabellini (2010). 
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 This question was present in all the waves.  
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In the following analysis I named destiny the measure of fatalism obtained from this alternative 
question. D‘Orlando, Ferrante and Ruiu (2011) show that fatalism is a quite persistent belief. In 
particular, they created an index of fatalism (IF) given by the mean score at the country level to the 
first question presented above
7
 and they checked the persistence of fatalism through the correlation 
between IF calculated on the first wave and that calculated on the fourth wave. Their results is 
replicated in Figure 1. In Figure 2, the mean score at country level for the variable destiny (from 
now, I will call ID this index) is plotted against the IF index (both indicators are calculated for the 
2005 wave). 
8
 
The first indicator seems to be a more appropriated measure  of structural fatalism (as defined in 
section 2), while the second indicator seems to be indicative of cosmological fatalism. As 
highlighted in Figure 2, ID and IF are strongly and significantly correlated
9
. In Table 3, I report the  
correlations among the IF index calculated on 2005 wave, the ID index calculated in 2005, and the 
IF index calculated on 1990 wave. Note that the ID index is strongly correlated also with the 
historical IF calculated in 1990. However, in this last case due to data availability the number of 
observations is limited to 21. Given these results, I feel quite comfortable in using the two questions 
as alternatives measures of fatalism. Moreover these preliminary results allow to highlight that 
fatalism possess a fundamental prerequisite to be considered a cultural traits, i.e. it is a persistent 
belief. However, this persistence may be caused by other factors as Institutions. Hence it is useful to 
investigate it in greater detail what are the determinants of fatalistic tendencies. 
 
»»»»  Insert Table 3 and Table 4 here, now at the end «««« 
In what follows, I will present some  empirical findings about the socio-economic and cultural  
determinants of fatalistic tendencies. In particular, the aim of the analysis is to test if once 
controlled for individual characteristics that may influence fatalistic tendencies (age, gender, 
education, health status, etc.), the income inequality and the strictness of the regulation  (the  
Durkheimian vision of fatalism),  cultural factors as religion (the Weberian vision of fatalism) and 
the interaction between these two factors (my vision of fatalism) are  still significant determinants 
of fatalism. 
 
»»»»  Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here, now at the end «««« 
 
In addition, I will  test also if some of the values characterizing the Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions 
may influence fatalism.  In particular the general model that I will estimate is: 
(1)   , , , *fatalistic tendencies f X Religion Institutions Religion Institutions  
Where x is a vector of individual controls.  
Let 
*
iy  represents the latent individual fatalistic tendencies and assume that  
*
iy   is determined by: 
 
 * 1 2 3 4*i i i ij i ijy x R I R I            
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 They use the first and the four waves and to  consider the widest time interval available, they limited their analysis to 
only  eighteen countries (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, South Korea, Malta, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, USA), which had been surveyed  on both  the 
first and the fourth wave. They normalized the index to be included in the interval [0,1]. 
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 See  table  4 for some descriptive statistics. 
9
 Mali, Egypt and Morocco seem to be outliers in Figure 2.I repeated  the analysis dropping these three countries, 
however the correlation is still strong and statistically significant. 
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Where Ri  denotes the religious beliefs of the i-th individual, Iij  represents the institutional settings 
of the j-th country where the i-th individual lives, and Ri* Iij is the interaction between institutions 
and religious beliefs, ε is a random error, in particular assume that   0,1N  
However, it is impossible to observe directly y*, what it possible to observe is the variable destiny 
taking on the values {1,2,…10}. Let      1 2 9...  be unknown threshold values and define: 
 

 


 

*
1
*
1 2
*
9
 = 1 if 
 = 2 if 
.
.
.
 = 10 if 
destiny y
destiny y
destiny y
 
 
Given the standard normal assumption on ε, it is it is straightforward to derive the conditional 
distribution of y given x,R,I and R*I: 
 
   
   
*
1
1 2 3 4 1 1 1 2 3 4
1| , , , * | , , , *
* *
i i i ij i ij i i i ij i ij
i i ij i ij i i ij i ij
P destiny x R I R I P y x R I R I
P x R I R I x R I R I

          
   
                      
   
 
 
   
   
*
2
2 1 2 3 4 1 1 2 3 4
2| , , , * 1 | , , , *
* *
i i i ij i ij i i i ij i ij
i i ij i ij i i ij i ij
P destiny x R I R I P y x R I R I
x R I R I x R I R I
 
         
    
                      
   
 
 
. 
. 
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   
 
*
9
9 1 2 3 4
10| , , , * | , , , *
1 *
i i i ij i ij i i i ij i ij
i i ij i ij
P destiny x R I R I P y x R I R I
x R I R I

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   
         
 
 
 
Where   is the standard normal c.d.f.. When the assumptions of standard normality is made, we 
are talking of ordered probit. However, other distributions may be assumed, in particular replacing a 
logistic function,   instead of  , gives the ordered logit. 
D‘Orlando et al. (2011) estimated  the above model using the variable fatalism as dependent 
variable.  
They find that once controlled for institutional settings (captured by country fixed effects), 
demographic and a large set of socio-economic variables, fatalism is still strongly correlated with 
religious beliefs. In particular,  being a religious person increases the probability of having a 
fatalistic view of life (with a particular strong effect for muslims). 
They interpret this finding as an evidence of the existence of an ongoing process of cultural 
transmission of  fatalistic tendencies among religious groups.  
 9 
I will replicate their analysis using the variable destiny
10
 as dependent variable instead of fatalism 
and adding some institutional and cultural controls. In next paragraph, I will describe in detail, all 
the elements of equation (1), while in paragraph 4.3 I will report the results of the analysis.  
4.2  Main variables 
 
As mentioned above the dependent variable of equation (1) is destiny
11
. I will show in the next 
paragraph the empirical results for three different specifications of  equation (1) while in the current 
paragraph I will describe the variables used on the right side of equation (1). 
To account for the effect of religion on fatalistic tendencies, I created a dummy variable termed 
atheist if an individual did not belong to a religious denomination and a dummy for each of the 
following ―dominant religions‖: Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, 
Evangelical, no denominational religion (if individual declares to being a religious person but to 
belong to a religion with no denomination), and other religion (which includes all religions differing 
from those listed).
12
 The relative questions in WVS are the following: ―a) Do you belong to a 
religious denomination? In case you do, answer which one; b) Independently of whether you attend 
religious services or not, would you say you are (read out and code one answer):  (1) A religious 
person (2) Not a religious person (3) A convinced atheist.‖. I split those declaring to not belonging 
to a religious denomination into two categories: atheist and belonging to a non denominational 
religion. In particular I define as atheist a person who has declared to being both a convinced atheist 
and to not belong to a religious denomination, while a person who has declared to being a religious 
person but to not belong to a religious denomination enters into the category no denominational 
religion. The reference category is atheist. See table 5 for some descriptive statistics.  
 
»»»»  Insert Table 5 here, now at the end «««« 
 
The Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1942) in one of his famous essay argued that the Christian 
tradition has affected the Italian culture so much that Italian cannot be considered non-Christian 
even if they are atheists. Hence,  extending this argument to other religions, I am assuming that the 
process of cultural transmission of fatalistic tendencies is strictly tied to religious beliefs. 
To capture the possible relation of fatalism  with Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions, I included the 
following variables: independence, longterm, masculinity, collectivism, riskseeker. The variables 
independence and longterm are obtained from the following questions: ―Here is a list of qualities 
that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially 
important? Please choose up to five. Independence; Hard work; Feeling of responsibility; 
Imagination; Tolerance and respect for other people; Thrift saving money and other thing; 
Determination, perseverance; Religious faith; Unselfishness; Obedience.”.  
The variable independence is a dummy equal to one if an individual has mentioned independence 
and at the same time not mentioned obedience as important qualities for his/her children. Following 
Hofstede, the emphasis on the value of independence as opposed to that of obedience is typical of 
society with low power distance.   
The variable longterm is a dummy equal to one if an individual has answered that both perseverance 
and thriftiness are important child qualities. According to Hofstede, these values reflect a society 
characterized by a long term orientation. 
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 Obviously, the analysis is focused on the fifth wave, and the  included countries  are: Andorra, Argentina, Australia, 
Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Cyprus, Germany, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, 
Indonesia, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan , Korea (republic of) , Morocco, Moldova, Mexico, Mali, Malaysia, Norway, 
Peru, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Vietnam, Zambia. 
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 For a similar analysis conducted on the alternative variable fatalism, the reader is referred to D‘Orlando, Ferrante, 
Ruiu (2011). 
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 By the term dominant religions I intend religions with the highest numbers of followers. 
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Masculinity and collectivism are obtained from the following question: “For each of the following 
statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, 
disagree, or disagree strongly? 
On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do. 
On the whole, men make better business executives than women do. 
One of my main goals in life has been to make my parents proud. 
I make a lot of effort to live up to what my friends expect.” 
I created a dummy variable equal to one if the individual  has answered ―strongly agree‖ or ―agree‖ 
to both the first and the second statement. Indeed, in my opinion, agreeing on these statement 
reflects a vision of the world in which exists prescribed gender role. 
The variable collectivism is a dummy that assumes value one, when the individual answered 
―strongly agree‖ or ―agree‖ to both the third and the fourth statement. In my interpretation, this 
variable may capture values that are typical of collectivistic (in the sense of Hofstede) society. 
The variable riskseeker is derived from the following question: ―Now I will briefly describe some 
people: Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life. Would you 
please indicate whether that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, 
or not at all like you ?”. 
I created a dummy equal to one if the individual has answered ―very much like you” or ―like you‖ to 
the above question.  
I also controlled for the education level of the individual. In particular, I created dummy variables 
for each of the possible levels reported on the following WVS question: ―What is the highest 
educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, code 
highest level s/he expects to complete]: (1) No formal education. (2) Incomplete primary school, (3) 
Complete primary school, (4) Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (5) Complete 
secondary school: technical/vocational type, (6) Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory 
type, (7) Complete secondary: university-preparatory type, (8) Some university-level education, 
without degree, (9) University-level education “. The reference category is no formal education.  
The associated dummy variables are named respectively: noeduc, incprimary, primary,   
inctechnical, technical incsecondary, secondary, someuniv, university. The reference category is 
noeduc. 
A control for the respondent‘s age and for the square of age were included in the analysis (named, 
age and agesquare, respectively) . To capture gender effects I included a dummy variable (termed 
female) equal to one if the respondent‘s sex was female. It is also like that the perceived state of 
health influences fatalistic behavior. I consequently included this control as well, considering the 
question: ―All in all, how would you describe your state of health these days? (1=very poor; 2 = 
poor; 3 = fair; 4= good; 5 = very good)”. I created an indicator equal to one if individual declares 
of being in a very poor or poor status of health and a dummy  for each of the remaining state of 
health. These variables were respectively named vphealth, fhealth, ghealth, vghealth. The reference 
category is vphealth.  
A control for the marital status and for the number of children (numchild)   of the respondents were 
included. In particular, for what regards the marital status,  I created an indicator for each of the 
following statuses: single, cohabiting, married, separated, divorced, widowed. The reference 
category is single. 
Among controls, I included also the perceived social class of the respondents. I considered the 
following question: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the lower class, the 
working class, the lower -middle class, the upper-middle class, or the upper class. Would you 
describe yourself.”.  I created a dummy for each social class. The reference is lower class.  
I built ten indicators of income level on the basis of the answers to the following question: Here is a 
scale of incomes. We would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, 
salaries, pensions, and other income that comes in. Just give the letter of the group your household 
falls into, before taxes and other deductions (income categories are coded by decile for each 
society, 1=lowest decile, 10=highest decile). These indicators are named respectively IncomeD1, 
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IncomeD2, IncomeD3, IncomeD4, IncomeD5, IncomeD6, IncomeD7, IncomeD8, IncomeD9, 
IncomeD10. The reference category is IncomeD1. 
Finally, to control for institutional settings, I included in addition to country fixed effects also the 
following variable: 
 
freedom:  A country level indicator that evaluates the extent of state control over travel, choice of 
residence, employment or institution of higher education; the right of citizens to own property and 
establish private businesses; the private business‘ freedom from unduly influence by government 
officials, security forces, political parties or organized crime; gender equality, freedom of choice of 
marriage partners and size of family; equality of opportunity and absence of economic exploitation. 
Countries are graded between 0 (worst) and 16 (best). The source is the Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights index furnished by Freedom House (2006).
13
  
 
Following Durkheim I expect a negative relation between individual autonomy and fatalistic 
tendencies.  
To capture the joint effect of culture and Institutions, I interacted each religion dummy with the 
variable freedom. The interaction effects are indicated as follows: catfreedom, protfreedom, 
orthfreedom, evanfreedom, musfreedom, budfreedom, hinfreedom, otherfreedom, nodenfreedom.   
 
4.3  Empirical results 
 
In Table 6, I have reported the results of the regression of the variable destiny on the above 
mentioned explanatory variables. In particular, column (a) reports the results of an ordered probit 
regression; column (b) shows the result of an ordered logit regression; column (c) reports the results 
of an OLS regression. In doing this, I will be able to evaluate if the obtained results  are robust to 
alternative specifications of the empirical model. In particular, I will be able to exclude that my 
results are driven by the normality assumption or by the non-linearity of the link function. The sign  
assumed by  the coefficients are all very reasonable and in general robust to different model 
specifications.    
Income and perceived social status exhibits a negative relationship with destiny, i.e. an increase in 
the income level/perceived social class is accompanied by a decrease in fatalistic tendencies and 
this result is statistically strong (at least for those with an income equal or above the median and 
considering themselves as belonging to the upper-middle class) in all the three specifications. I 
recall that destiny is ordered in a such way that a positive sign has to be interpreted as a decrease in 
fatalistic tendencies, obviously the opposite holds for negative signs. Considering model (a), the 
marginal effects on the probability of outcome 1 (i.e. the probability that an individual is extremely 
fatalistic)  associated to IncomeD2, IncomeD3, IncomeD4, IncomeD5, IncomeD6, IncomeD7, 
incomeD8, IncomeD9, IncomeD10 calculated taking all the regressors at their mean are 
respectively of  : -0.8%, -0.9%, - 1%,-1.4%, -1.9%, -2.5%,- 2.4%, -2.6%,-4%.
14
 
The inclusion of income in the model, allows me  to avoid a possible omitted variable criticism. 
That is, following Weber, it is possible that some religious beliefs may encourage/disregard wealth 
accumulation (unfortunately WVS contains data only on income and not on wealth), and hence if 
income was excluded from the analysis, one may argue that the relation between religious beliefs  
and the level of fatalism is significant only for its mediating effect on income. However, one needs 
caution in interpreting the relation between income (or social class) and fatalistic tendencies as 
causal. In particular, these results are likely to be affected by a reverse causality problem. Indeed, as 
shown by Caliendo et al. (2010)
15
 ,  less fatalistic people are likely to be more able to search for 
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 The values assumed in each country considered is reported in the appendix. Downloadable from: 
www.freedomhouse.org 
14
 The change in probability is calculated using the user written command mfx2 created by Williams (2007).  
15
 See also McGee (2009). 
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better job opportunities in term of income and hence it is this search ability, influenced by fatalistic 
beliefs, to generate the negative relation between the latter and income. Anyway, at the contrary it is 
also possible that people who have been particularly unsuccessful/successful in terms of income 
may  attribute their output to an averse fate/their actions. 
With the available data, I am not able to establish the direction of the causality, hence I will limit to 
observe that there are evidences of a strong negative correlation between fatalistic tendencies and 
income levels.  
I decided to include social class in addition to income, because  even if these two variables may 
capture similar concepts and the first may be determined by the latter, the perceived social class 
may capture a cultural influenced evaluation of the individual position in the society. Furthermore, 
if social class was entirely determined by income considerations, the associated coefficients would 
be insignificant. However it seems to be not the case, here. In particular belonging to the upper 
class, to the upper-middle or to the working class implies a decrease in the probability of being 
fatalistic with respect to people belonging to the lower class, respectively of -1.9%, -1.3%, -0.7%. 
As regards education levels, the associated dummy coefficients  take a positive sign and are highly 
significant in all the specifications. Therefore when education increases, the probability of being a 
person with extreme fatalistic tendencies decreases. The decrease in the  probability of being a very 
fatalistic person associated to incprimary, primary, intechnical, technical, incsecondary, secondary, 
someuniv, university with respect noeduc is respectively of: -1.4%, -2.4%, -3.1%, -3.9%, -3.4%, -
4%, -4.9%, -4.86%. 
D‘Orlando et al. (2011) argues that education can weaken the link between transmitted culture and 
beliefs and make individuals more inclined to believe that they have greater control over life-events. 
They empirically find a similar relation between education and fatalism, however the current 
findings  are obtained both with a more appropriated measure of fatalistic tendencies and with a  
more accurate measure of education (they use the age at which one has completed his education as a 
proxy for the education level). Unfortunately, as observed in D‘Orlando et al., it is difficult to 
establish a causal link from education to fatalism because a higher level of education may reflect a 
higher level of unobserved ability possessed by an individual, so that the decrease in fatalism may 
be caused by the individual‘s higher skills. Perhaps education plays a role in this case, too, given 
that the technology of skill formation is characterized by strong complementarities between 
cognitive skills and non-cognitive traits (Cuhna and Heckman, 2007) such as fatalism. Education 
improves people‘s skills, and it may make individuals more aware of their abilities and therefore 
less fatalistic. To be on the safe side, I merely state that there is strong evidence for a negative 
relation between fatalism and education. 
Also the relation between health and fatalism takes the expected sign: a betterment in the perceived 
state of health is accompanied by a decrease in fatalistic tendencies. In particular the decrease in the 
probability of being a person with a high fatalistic tendencies associated to vghealth, ghealth, 
fhealth is respectively of -3.8%, -2.8%, -1.7%.
16
 
Also gender plays a role in fatalistic attitudes, with women being more likely to believe that life-
events are driven by the fate (the associated increase in probability of outcome 1 is about 1.3%).  As 
observed by D‘Orlando et al., this can be rationalized in various ways mostly reliant on the impact 
of culture and education. Unfortunately, still today women in many countries are far from being 
emancipated, and values transferred through culture and education tend to strengthen an antiquated 
vision of the female‘s role (see also Guiso and Rustichini,2011  and Thèbaud,2010). Hence, it is 
possible that this attitude towards women has generated a feeling of  ―resignation‖. The sign of 
masculinity seems to give some support to this idea, however it is not statistically significant 
(maybe the effect of a gender‘s role effect is captured entirely by the gender‘s dummy). 
Age and its square are not statistically significant. This finding suggests that the controls inserted in 
my regressions are capturing all the possible life-cycle effects influencing fatalistic tendencies. 
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 I‘m aware that also in this case a reverse causality argument may apply. That is, there is strong evidence in medical 
literature that fatalistic beliefs negatively influence health screening behavior. Hence if fatalistic persons are particularly 
careless for what regards their health these may cause the observed relation between fatalism and health status.  
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Among marital status controls, only widowed are more likely to being very fatalistic with respect to 
single people. In particular the increase in the probability associated to widowed is about 1.4%. This 
result suggests that very dramatic event in life as the death of a spouse, may increase individual 
fatalistic beliefs as a sort of psychological defensive mechanism.    
As far as religions are concerned, people declaring that they belong to a religion (independently 
from their religious affiliation) show a higher probability of being fatalistic. In particular, being 
“Orthodox”, “Muslim”, “Evangelical”, “Buddhist”, “Protestant”, “Catholic”, “adhering to a non 
denominational religion” or to a religion different from the formers,   corresponds to an increase in 
the probability of being a person with extreme fatalistic tendency  respectively of 3%, 3.3%, 3.9%, 
3.5%, 3%, 2.9%, 2.4%, 1.8%. Only the dummy ―hindu‖ is not statistically significant. However, it 
is likely that the effect of Hindu affiliation is captured by the dummy relative to India.
17
 It is 
worthwhile to note that the effect religious beliefs on fatalistic beliefs are very close across the 
various faiths in terms of magnitude. This can be interpreted as an evidence against the ―clash of 
civilization‖ thesis according to which Islamic tenets are at the basis of fatalistic tendencies.  At the 
same time, this finding represents an evidence partly contrasting Weber‘s thesis. In fact, even if 
religions seem to play an important role in determining fatalistic tendencies, according to Weber 
one may expect very differentiated effect across faiths.   
For what regards the controls associated to Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions, only power distance and 
risk avoidance are significantly correlated with fatalism in all the specifications. In particular,  low 
power distance and being a risk seeker are associated with a decrease in the probability of being an 
extremely fatalistic person  respectively of 1.15% and 1.29%.   
Finally for what regards Institutions, the country fixed are almost all strongly statistical significant. 
Also the variable freedom is statistically significant in all the three specifications. In particular, an 
increase of one point in the indicator individual autonomy is associated to a decrease of 0.4% in the 
probability of being an extremely fatalistic person.  
Interestingly, confirming the idea that religious beliefs and Institutions play a joint role in 
determining fatalistic beliefs, the interactions between freedom and religious affiliation are 
significant for Muslim, Hinduism, Orthodox, Otherrel and Buddhist. However, in the first four cases 
the sign of the coefficients are negative, implying that given the level of individual autonomy 
characterizing the country in which the individual lives,  being an adherent to one of the mentioned 
religion increases the probability of being an extremely fatalistic person  respectively of  0.4%, 
0.1%, 0.15%, 0.11%, while being Buddhist decrease that probability of 0.16%. This last result 
however is not surprising since one of dogma of Buddhism, the ―Annica‖, is the acceptance of the 
present situation and at the same time the recognition that the world is always changing. Therefore 
this system of beliefs may not imply the hypothesized cultural resistance that instead characterize 
other religions.  
Another interesting result is that inherent the interaction between “Orthodox” and ―freedom”. 
Given the fact that the Orthodox faith is predominant in Eastern Europe Countries, the negative sign 
of the interaction between freedom and orthodox (the only Christian faith for which the interaction 
is significant) may indicate  the presence of a process of cultural resistance to the institutional 
innovations that are going on in those countries. 
To further test the idea that the ―transformative potential‖ of a religion is particularly important in 
the process of formation of fatalistic tendencies,  following Guiso et al. (2006) I look at a historical 
episode of discontinuous change in religious doctrine to study its impact on people‘s beliefs. This 
change was brought about by the Second Vatican Council, which in 1962 substantially modified 
Catholic doctrine and teaching.  In particular, the council has determined  an opening up of dialogue 
with the other religious denominations and hence an increase in the Eisenstadt‘s transformative 
potential  of the Catholic faith. As a result, Catholics after 1960 received a very different education 
from Catholics of earlier generations. Therefore, I expect that people born  (and  educated) after 
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1960  should be less fatalistic than earlier generations.  In Table 7  I replicated the analysis reported 
in Table 4, but adding to the explanatory variables a dummy equal to one (named catcouncil) when 
a member of the Catholic faith is born after 1960. Also in this case I test various empirical 
specifications of the model. In particular, column a, b,c indicate the results of an ordered probit 
regression, an ordered logit regression and an ols, respectively. 
Giving support to my hypothesis, the coefficient relative to catcouncil is positive and statistically 
significant. For what regards other results, all the former findings reported in Table 4 are confirmed.  
 
»»»»  Insert Table 6 and Table 7 here, now at the end «««« 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
In this paper, after a clarification of both the concept of culture and fatalism, it has been argued that 
fatalistic tendencies are the output of the interaction between cultural factors (and in particular of 
religion) and  historical Institutional experience. This idea has been tested against two well known 
sociological theories on the origin of fatalism: Weberian cosmological fatalism and Durkheim 
structural fatalism.    
The data supports the Durkeimian idea that a more  regulated society tends to be also more 
fatalistic.  
However note that the direction of the causality is not so straightforward.  As sustained by 
D‘Orlando et al., it may be that higher fatalistic tendencies  determine higher demand of protection 
and hence higher level of regulation or at the contrary it may be that it is regulation to generate 
fatalistic tendencies. Anyway, if Institutions  are the expression of the  preferences of  the members 
of a society (at least in democratic societies), the first explanation seem to be more plausible. In this 
paper, it has been argued that the origins of fatalistic beliefs have to be traced in historical 
experiences and that religious beliefs may have furnished a mechanism of persistence of fatalistic 
tendencies. This idea seems to be supported by the sign of the interaction effect between religion 
and the indicator of individual autonomy. Indeed, given the level assumed by the indicator of  
individual autonomy, belonging to  a religious denomination imply an increase in fatalistic 
tendencies (at least for four religious faiths). The fact that among Christian faiths only the 
interaction between being orthodox and freedom  is significant represents a further proof of this 
idea. In fact, Orthodox faith is predominant in Eastern Europe countries, which are countries that 
have experienced a dramatic deregulation in recent years. The negative sign of the interaction 
between ―freedom” and ―orthodox”  therefore suggests that a sort of cultural resistance to 
institutional innovations is going on in those countries. 
Also the direct effect of religion on fatalistic beliefs  seems to be an important  element determining 
fatalistic tendencies. However, contrasting with Weber‘s theory, there are not large differences 
across the various faiths. In other terms, being religious independently from the religious affiliation 
implies a more fatalistic view of life.  his last finding gives support to Acevedo criticism on the 
―clash  of civilization‖ theory.   
For what regards other cultural controls, some values reflecting Hofstede‘s power distance and risk 
avoidance seem to be related to fatalistic tendencies. 
Among other controls, income, perceived social status and education are strongly related to 
fatalistic tendencies. In particular people with low income and considering themselves at the bottom 
of the social class tend to be more fatalistic, suggesting that on this point Durkheim thesis may be 
right. For what regards education, an increase in its level lower fatalistic tendencies. Furthermore 
education has in terms of magnitude  the largest impact on fatalism among all the controls 
considered. This clearly suggests a possible instrument to fight fatalistic tendencies.  However, the 
direction of the causality remains an open issue (as for income and social status).   
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Table 1: Hofstede’s Cultural dimensions 
Power distance (Hofstede, 1980) 
Degree of tolerance of less powerful 
members of a society for hierarchical or 
unequal relantionship. 
High: large degree of tolerance for an unequal 
distribution of power 
Low: low degree of tolerance for an unequal distribution 
of power 
A  society‘s power distance level is bred in ist families 
through the extent to which ist children are socialized 
toward obedience or toward initiative. 
Uncertainty (ambiguity) avoidance 
(Hofstede 1980) 
A society‘s tolerance for uncertainty and 
ambiguity.  It indicates to what extent a 
culture programs its members to feel either 
uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured 
situations.  
Strong: little acceptance for ambiguity or risk 
Weak: generally accepting ambiguity or risk 
Strong uncertainty avoiding cultures try to minimize the 
possibility of such situations by strict laws and rules, 
safety and security measures. 
Individualism versus Collectivism 
(Hofstede, 1980) 
Degree of emphasis on individual 
accomplishment 
 
Individualism: large emphasis on individual 
accomplishment 
Collectivism: large emphasis on group accomplishment 
Collectivistic societes are those in which people from 
birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive 
groups, often extendes families (with uncles, aunts and 
granparents) which continue to protecting them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty. 
Masculinity versus femminity (Hofstede, 
1980) 
Refers tot he distribution of  emotional roles 
between the sexes.  
Masculinity: large degree of stress on achievement and 
competition. 
Femminity: large degree of stress on relationship and 
solidarity. 
In masculine countries women are somewhat assertive 
and competitive, but not as much as men, so that these 
countries show a gap between men‘s value and women‘s 
values. 
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Long term versus short term orientation 
(Hofstede,1991) 
the extent to which a society exhibits a 
pragmatic, future-oriented perspective rather 
than a conventional historic or short-term 
perspective.  
Long term orientation: values associated to long term 
orientation are thrift, perseverance, acceptance of 
change. This is also called Confucian-ethic. 
Short term orientation: values associated to short term 
orientation are respect for tradition, fulfilling social 
obligations, and protecting one‘s  reputation.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Other cultural manifestations 
Heroes: 
Hofstede defines heroes as:  ―persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who possess characteristics which are 
highly prized in a culture, and who thus serve as models for behavior‖ (1997, p. 8).  
Rituals: 
Rook defines ritual as: ―a type of expressive, symbolic activity constructed of multiple behaviors that occur in a 
fixed, episodic sequence, and that tend to be repeated over time. 
Ritual behavior is dramatically scripted and acted out and is performed with formality, seriousness, and inner 
intensity.‖ (1985, p.252) 
In addition McCraken argues that ritual is : ―a social action devoted to the manipulation of the cultural meaning 
for purposes of collective and individual communication and categorization. Ritual is an opportunity to affirm, 
evoke, assign, or revise the conventional symbols and meanings of the cultural order.‖ (1988,p.84) 
 
Symbols:   
 According to Geertz  symbols are: ― a broad category of processes and objects that carry 
a meaning that is unique to a particular group of people‖ (1973, p.79) 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlations among fatalism index 
 
IF05 ID05 IF90 
IF05 1 
  
    ID05 0.6796 1 
 
 
(0.0001) 
  IF90 0.6789 0.5949 1 
 
(0.0003) (0.0057) 
 *Significance levels are on parenthesis 
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Table 4: Some descriptive statistics  
cty   destiny fatalism freedom cty   destiny fatalism freedom 
                    
AND mean 6.873 7.725 15.000 JPN mean 6.706 6.076 13.000 
  sd 2.529 1.785     sd 2.161 1.889   
ARG mean 6.856 7.857 13.000 KOR mean 7.068 6.798 11.000 
  sd 3.135 2.074     sd 2.132 1.984   
AUS mean 7.264 7.688 15.000 MAR mean 2.906 5.297 8.000 
  sd 2.029 1.886     sd 2.269 2.400   
BFA mean 4.567 5.704 8.000 MDA mean 6.413 6.910 9.000 
  sd 3.197 2.657     sd 2.856 2.203   
BGR mean 5.585 5.802 13.000 MEX mean 7.806 8.383 12.000 
  sd 2.624 2.288     sd 3.137 2.083   
BRA mean 6.915 7.728 12.000 MLI mean 3.582 6.123 9.000 
  sd 2.989 2.199     sd 3.033 2.716   
CAN mean 7.175 7.628 16.000 MYS mean 6.022 7.310 9.000 
  sd 2.125 1.838     sd 2.348 1.710   
CHE mean 6.463 7.523 16.000 NLD mean . 6.625 16.000 
  sd 2.328 1.765     sd . 1.784   
CHL mean 7.323 7.304 14.000 NOR mean 7.225 7.710 16.000 
  sd 2.489 2.185     sd 2.139 1.565   
CHN mean 6.674 7.235 7.000 NZL mean . 7.911 15.000 
  sd 2.929 2.341     sd . 1.832   
COL mean . 8.044 10.000 PER mean 7.987 7.132 9.000 
  sd . 2.197     sd 2.644 2.213   
CYP mean 6.805 7.444 15.000 POL mean 6.144 6.563 13.000 
  sd 2.754 2.216     sd 2.540 2.288   
DEU mean 6.607 6.728 15.000 ROM mean 6.144 7.637 11.000 
  sd 2.314 2.144     sd 2.833 2.223   
EGY mean 2.691 5.969 7.000 RUS mean . 7.101 6.000 
  sd 2.324 2.588     sd . 2.546   
ESP mean 6.507 6.879 15.000 RWA mean 5.223 6.518 5.000 
  sd 2.340 1.729     sd 2.637 2.010   
ETH mean 5.882 6.169 6.000 SRB mean 6.332 6.453 13.000 
  sd 2.464 2.078     sd 2.449 2.059   
FIN mean 6.672 7.450 16.000 SVN mean 7.109 7.488 12.000 
  sd 2.158 1.733     sd 2.584 2.174   
FRA mean . 6.666 15.000 SWE mean 7.439 7.833 16.000 
  sd . 2.054     sd 2.163 1.628   
GBR mean . 7.254 15.000 THA mean 6.888 6.922 11.000 
  sd . 1.942     sd 2.166 1.923   
GEO mean 5.695 6.401 10.000 TTO mean 6.260 7.883 11.000 
  sd 2.941 2.479     sd 3.396 2.225   
GHA mean 5.210 7.095 10.000 TUR mean 5.963 7.404 10.000 
  sd 3.304 2.462     sd 3.079 2.368   
GTM mean . 7.480 8.000 TWN mean 6.943 7.397 13.000 
  sd . 2.117     sd 2.376 2.175   
HON mean . 6.318 9.000 UKR mean 6.156 6.085 11.000 
  sd . 2.006     sd 2.769 2.298   
IDN mean 6.557 7.386 9.000 URY mean 5.982 7.794 15.000 
  sd 2.624 2.269     sd 2.901 2.010   
IND mean 5.514 6.047 10.000 USA mean 7.087 7.691 15.000 
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  sd 3.796 2.824     sd 2.048 1.743   
IRN mean 6.779 7.064 4.000 VNM mean 7.485 7.062 8.000 
  sd 2.824 2.116     sd 2.524 2.086   
IRQ mean . 5.412 6.000 ZAF mean 6.478 7.807 12.000 
  sd . 2.726     sd 2.800 2.133   
ITA mean 6.147 6.336 15.000 ZMB mean 6.467 7.200 . 
  sd 2.351 2.062     sd 2.774 2.409 . 
JOR mean 7.576 7.688 7.000 Total mean 6.243 7.021 10.765 
  sd 2.613 2.528     sd 2.929 2.320 3.452 
sd=standard deviation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Some descriptive statistics  
cty catholic muslim buddhist hindu orthodox evangelical protestant otherrel nodenomrel atheist 
AND 0.543 0.012 0.000 0.009 0.003 0.000 0.010 0.230 0.059 0.134 
ARG 0.741 0.000 0.064 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.119 0.046 0.023 
AUS 0.232 0.002 0.010 0.006 0.020 0.000 0.287 0.264 0.082 0.096 
BFA 0.308 0.533 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.078 0.069 0.007 0.002 
BGR 0.001 0.098 0.002 0.000 0.735 0.000 0.003 0.110 0.018 0.033 
BRA 0.603 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.207 0.019 0.086 0.075 0.005 
CAN 0.405 0.011 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.157 0.268 0.104 0.041 
CHE 0.410 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.328 0.142 0.045 0.059 
CHL 0.603 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.168 0.135 0.060 0.033 
CHN 0.000 0.024 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.610 0.113 0.174 
COL 0.741 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.075 0.028 0.086 0.065 0.004 
CYP 0.003 0.451 0.000 0.000 0.494 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.029 
DEU 0.208 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.331 0.000 0.247 0.033 0.166 
EGY 0.000 0.936 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.000 
ESP 0.797 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.124 0.009 0.063 
ETH 0.015 0.105 0.001 0.000 0.647 0.000 0.194 0.037 0.000 0.001 
FIN 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.808 0.000 0.104 0.060 0.015 
FRA 0.411 0.049 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.018 0.264 0.087 0.163 
GBR 0.102 0.038 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.256 0.388 0.112 0.087 
GEO 0.003 0.033 0.001 0.001 0.935 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.007 0.002 
GHA 0.208 0.149 0.001 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.553 0.044 0.008 0.001 
GTM 0.560 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.293 0.015 0.103 0.021 0.005 
HON 0.029 0.001 0.128 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.704 0.002 0.054 
IDN 0.000 0.921 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.008 0.003 0.000 
IND 0.000 0.081 0.018 0.756 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.031 0.002 
IRN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.003 0.000 
IRQ 0.001 0.618 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.379 0.001 0.000 
ITA 0.875 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.048 0.020 
JOR 0.010 0.983 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
JPN 0.007 0.000 0.311 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.494 0.070 0.109 
KOR 0.213 0.001 0.250 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.228 0.088 0.003 0.214 
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MAR 0.000 0.993 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 
MDA 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.923 0.000 0.033 0.025 0.000 0.009 
MEX 0.722 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.010 0.112 0.083 0.015 
MLI 0.018 0.930 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.026 0.014 0.001 
MYS 0.070 0.574 0.201 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.018 0.008 0.005 
NLD 0.249 0.013 0.002 0.001 0.054 0.004 0.109 0.383 0.129 0.057 
NOR 0.013 0.010 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.626 0.244 0.053 0.048 
NZL 0.137 0.002 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.749 0.045 0.055 
PER 0.711 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.103 0.049 0.010 
POL 0.944 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.008 0.023 0.002 0.012 
ROM 0.075 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.865 0.000 0.050 0.006 0.000 0.002 
RUS 0.004 0.040 0.008 0.000 0.552 0.000 0.006 0.256 0.093 0.039 
RWA 0.523 0.150 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.299 0.020 0.002 0.001 
SRB 0.039 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.871 0.000 0.007 0.030 0.007 0.018 
SVN 0.651 0.013 0.002 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.017 0.142 0.071 0.083 
SWE 0.016 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.843 0.045 0.089 
THA 0.000 0.025 0.968 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.000 
TTO 0.205 0.049 0.004 0.231 0.004 0.000 0.440 0.030 0.034 0.004 
TUR 0.000 0.989 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.004 
TWN 0.008 0.001 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.041 0.600 0.063 0.103 
UKR 0.068 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.603 0.000 0.004 0.182 0.115 0.023 
URY 0.338 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.053 0.016 0.321 0.193 0.076 
USA 0.205 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.321 0.314 0.130 0.022 
VNM 0.062 0.001 0.154 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.671 0.035 0.064 
ZAF 0.122 0.018 0.003 0.018 0.004 0.095 0.336 0.342 0.055 0.007 
ZMB 0.342 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.463 0.162 0.012 0.003 
 
*Percentage of individuals adhering to the corresponding faith 
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Table 6: The determinants of fatalistic tendencies 
 
 
[a] [b] [c] 
    
Age -0.0014(0.0024) -0.0036(0.0041) -0.0021(0.0063)  
Agesquare 0.0000(0.0000) 0.0000(0.0000) 0.0000(0.0001)  
Female -0.0819***(0.0147) -0.143***(0.0242) -0.208***(0.0372)  
Fhealth 0.109***(0.0220) 0.205***(0.0367) 0.305***(0.0535)  
Ghealth 0.177***(0.0244) 0.325***(0.0430) 0.493***(0.0568)  
Vghealth 0.261***(0.0340) 0.473***(0.0582) 0.674***(0.0782)  
Upperclass 0.126*(0.0740) 0.263**(0.134) 0.273(0.175)  
Upmidclass 0.0864***(0.0276) 0.160***(0.0482) 0.206***(0.0709)  
Lowmidclass 0.0138(0.0243) 0.0315(0.0451) 0.0391(0.0631)  
Workingclass 0.0413**(0.0194) 0.0899***(0.0344) 0.0971*(0.0500)  
IncomeD2 0.0501*(0.0284) 0.102*(0.0577) 0.186**(0.0720)  
IncomeD3 0.0539(0.0363) 0.107(0.0661) 0.197**(0.0875)  
IncomeD4 0.0633*(0.0331) 0.118*(0.0641) 0.241***(0.0801)  
IncomeD5 0.0873***(0.0328) 0.150**(0.0636) 0.292***(0.0833)  
IncomeD6 0.128***(0.0353) 0.231***(0.0660) 0.417***(0.0908)  
IncomeD7 0.168***(0.0421) 0.300***(0.0777) 0.521***(0.102)  
IncomeD8 0.161***(0.0426) 0.288***(0.0794) 0.475***(0.107)  
IncomeD9 0.178***(0.0501) 0.319***(0.0901) 0.540***(0.125)  
IncomeD10 0.304***(0.0681) 0.518***(0.118) 0.762***(0.144)  
Nodenomrel -0.138**(0.0560) -0.245**(0.0961) -0.355**(0.133)  
Catholic -0.169***(0.0537) -0.281***(0.0907) -0.384***(0.129)  
Muslim -0.191**(0.0764) -0.299**(0.130) -0.440**(0.182)  
Protestant -0.168***(0.0606) -0.272***(0.103) -0.402***(0.145)  
Orthodox -0.170**(0.0702) -0.274**(0.119) -0.394**(0.176)  
Buddhist -0.191**(0.0746) -0.311**(0.125) -0.459**(0.183)  
Hindu -0.130(0.0892) -0.184(0.177) -0.358*(0.210)  
Evangelical -0.210***(0.0446) -0.332***(0.0745) -0.494***(0.109)  
Otherrel -0.108***(0.0412) -0.175***(0.0678) -0.250**(0.0954)  
Married 0.0278*(0.0163) 0.0520*(0.0300) 0.0553(0.0406)  
Cohabite 0.0120(0.0240) 0.0203(0.0414) 0.0122(0.0621)  
Divorced 0.0257(0.0328) 0.0471(0.0567) 0.0299(0.0816)  
Separated 0.0090(0.0434) 0.0145(0.0712) -0.0102(0.108)  
Widowed -0.0834**(0.0357) -0.151**(0.0614) -0.232**(0.0910)  
Numchild -0.00716(0.00472) -0.0129(0.00834) -0.0170(0.0116)  
Incprimary 0.0922***(0.0342) 0.160**(0.0636) 0.187*(0.0944)  
Primary 0.158***(0.0331) 0.282***(0.0602) 0.345***(0.0851)  
Inctechnical 0.215***(0.0355) 0.378***(0.0641) 0.497***(0.0908)  
Tecnical 0.270***(0.0317) 0.456***(0.0575) 0.636***(0.0859)  
Incsecondary 0.241***(0.0391) 0.415***(0.0732) 0.566***(0.0956)  
Secondary 0.284***(0.0322) 0.489***(0.0575) 0.678***(0.0858)  
Someuniv 0.381***(0.0392) 0.638***(0.0715) 0.967***(0.104)  
University 0.357***(0.0337) 0.594***(0.0609) 0.911***(0.0814)  
Independence 0.0551***(0.0179) 0.0857***(0.0306) 0.146***(0.0465)  
Longterm 0.0280(0.0191) 0.0399(0.0337) 0.0657(0.0471)  
Collectivism 0.0069(0.0484) 0.00337(0.0901) -0.0205(0.112)  
Masculinity -0.0455(0.0290) -0.0905*(0.0533) -0.128(0.0787)  
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Riskseeker 0.0886***(0.0310) 0.164***(0.0509) 0.189**(0.0796)  
Freedom 0.0253***(0.00276) 0.0444***(0.00506) 0.0878***(0.0065)  
Catfreedom -0.00183(0.00187) -0.00112(0.00346) -0.0090*(0.0046)  
Protfreedom -0.0037(0.0034) -0.00503(0.00612) -0.0103(0.0088)  
Evanfreedom -0.0054(0.0069) -0.00976(0.0113) -0.0209(0.0186)  
Musfreedom -0.0248***(0.0052) -0.0457***(0.00938) -0.0717***(0.0123)  
Hinfreedom -0.0071*(0.0037) -0.0160**(0.0081) -0.0166*(0.0088)  
Budfreedom 0.0097***(0.00195) 0.0193***(0.0036) 0.0225***(0.0051)  
Otherfreedom -0.0069***(0.0025) -0.0095**(0.0043) -0.0208***(0.0070)  
Nodenfreedom -0.0065(0.0046) -0.00902(0.00757) -0.0149(0.0106)  
Orthfreedom -0.0088**(0.0036) -0.0151**(0.0066) -0.0263**(0.0099)  
AND -0.0219(0.0244) -0.0184(0.0419) -0.185***(0.0600)  
AUS 0.0896***(0.0249) 0.140***(0.0383) 0.231***(0.0538)  
BFA -0.241***(0.0246) -0.470***(0.0443) -0.720***(0.0591)  
BGR -0.261***(0.0353) -0.489***(0.0648) -0.822***(0.0927)  
BRA 0.357***(0.0182) 0.690***(0.0358) 0.782***(0.0412)  
CAN 0.0885***(0.0270) 0.144***(0.0427) 0.226***(0.0582)  
CHE -0.234***(0.0261) -0.395***(0.0457) -0.689***(0.0594)  
CHL 0.393***(0.0216) 0.645***(0.0380) 0.822***(0.0453)  
CHN 0.307***(0.0275) 0.574***(0.0502) 0.763***(0.0645)  
CYP 0.169***(0.0420) 0.295***(0.0759) 0.292**(0.109)  
DEU -0.0267*(0.0145) -0.0566**(0.0254) -0.120***(0.0359)  
EGY -1.029***(0.0449) -1.731***(0.0862) -2.429***(0.111)  
ESP -0.0107(0.0244) -0.0202(0.0447) -0.113*(0.0590)  
ETH 0.0389(0.0322) 0.0468(0.0566) 0.187** (0.0848)  
GEO -0.0416(0.0386) -0.145**(0.0717) -0.256**(0.106)  
GHA -0.175***(0.0285) -0.412***(0.0535) -0.637***(0.0653)  
IDN 0.299***(0.0424) 0.506***(0.0760) 0.801***(0.106)  
IND -0.132**(0.0624) -0.386***(0.130) -0.577***(0.152)  
ITA -0.173***(0.0245) -0.294***(0.0415) -0.514***(0.0577)  
JPN -0.0452(0.0289) -0.0713(0.0465) -0.0865(0.0694)  
KOR 0.167***(0.0250) 0.281***(0.0421) 0.462***(0.0584)  
MAR -0.945***(0.0458) -1.557***(0.0861) -2.320***(0.104)  
MDA 0.124***(0.0478) 0.234***(0.0842) 0.284**(0.125)  
MEX 0.788***(0.0363) 1.596***(0.0833) 1.510***(0.0596)  
MLI -0.576***(0.0488) -1.080***(0.0893) -1.534***(0.121)  
MYS -0.0385(0.0384) -0.0710(0.0694) -0.0501(0.0969)  
NOR 0.0394(0.0312) 0.0797(0.0492) 0.0860(0.0706)  
PER 0.948***(0.0301) 1.724***(0.0711) 2.081***(0.0427)  
POL -0.0892***(0.0260) -0.165***(0.0469) -0.266***(0.0621)  
ROM 0.0447(0.0379) 0.0832(0.0688) 0.0433(0.102)  
SRB -0.0263(0.0384) -0.0339(0.0671) -0.118(0.103)  
SVN 0.254***(0.0222) 0.454***(0.0372) 0.562***(0.0477)  
SWE 0.0723**(0.0317) 0.124**(0.0530) 0.111(0.0672)  
THA 0.160***(0.0487) 0.276***(0.0837) 0.522***(0.126)  
TTO 0.0478(0.0320) 0.126**(0.0587) -0.0743(0.0762)  
TUR 0.206***(0.0432) 0.347***(0.0770) 0.475***(0.107)  
TWN 0.0700***(0.0257) 0.130***(0.0440) 0.156**(0.0625)  
UKR -0.0579*(0.0310) -0.0792(0.0523) -0.246***(0.0805)  
URY -0.159***(0.0218) -0.318***(0.0413) -0.625***(0.0476)  
VNM 0.540***(0.0296) 0.957***(0.0587) 1.318***(0.0633)  
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ZAF 0.0811***(0.0241) 0.136***(0.0425) 0.126**(0.0527)  
IRN 0.334***(0.0333) 0.604***(0.0607) 0.905***(0.0806)  
ZMB 0.167***(0.0172) 0.294***(0.0284) 0.463***(0.0389)  
Const . . 4.426***(0.224) 
N 59047 59047 59047 
R2 
  
0.209 
PseudoR2 0.050 0.052 
 
Sample weights suggested by the survey‘s authors have been used to ensure national representativeness 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: The effect of the Second Vatican Council 
  (a) (b) (c) 
         
 age -0.0017 (0.0018)    -0.0040 (0.0030)    -0.0022 (0.0045)    
 agesquare 0.0000 (0.0000)    0.0001* (0.0000)    0.0000 (0.0000)    
 female -0.0780*** (0.0093) -0.1362*** (0.0157) -0.1966*** (0.0234)    
fhealth 0.1107*** (0.0202) 0.2076*** (0.0353) 0.3090*** (0.0516)   
ghealth 0.1801*** (0.0200) 0.3294*** (0.0349) 0.4980*** (0.0509)   
vghealth 0.2643*** (0.0218) 0.4789*** (0.0380) 0.6801*** (0.0551)   
upperclass 0.1298*** (0.0475) 0.2734*** (0.0842) 0.2774** (0.1144)    
 upmidclass 0.0927*** (0.0191) 0.1709*** (0.0327) 0.2211*** (0.0481)   
lowmidclass 0.0169 (0.0160)    0.0370 (0.0275)    0.0462 (0.0404)    
 workingclass 0.0437*** (0.0162) 0.0939*** (0.0279) 0.1023** (0.0410)    
 IncomeD2 0.0493** (0.0231)    0.1006** (0.0415)    0.1836*** (0.0571)   
IncomeD3 0.0578** (0.0224)    0.1136*** (0.0403) 0.2065*** (0.0553)   
IncomeD4 0.0599*** (0.0227) 0.1117*** (0.0408) 0.2321*** (0.0561)   
IncomeD5 0.0874*** (0.0224) 0.1510*** (0.0403) 0.2921*** (0.0549)   
IncomeD6 0.1239*** (0.0235) 0.2238*** (0.0420) 0.4056*** (0.0580)   
IncomeD7 0.1712*** (0.0248) 0.3060*** (0.0439) 0.5282*** (0.0607)   
IncomeD8 0.1618*** (0.0277) 0.2908*** (0.0482) 0.4771*** (0.0686)   
IncomeD9 0.1845*** (0.0335) 0.3308*** (0.0574) 0.5502*** (0.0823)   
IncomeD10 0.3033*** (0.0379) 0.5208*** (0.0641) 0.7573*** (0.0888)   
nodenomrel -0.1476*** (0.0347) -0.2609*** (0.0582) -0.3783*** (0.0848)    
catholic -0.2031*** (0.0304) -0.3275*** (0.0506) -0.4778*** (0.0752)    
muslim -0.1763*** (0.0396) -0.2744*** (0.0671) -0.4071*** (0.0995)    
protestant -0.1628*** (0.0310) -0.2622*** (0.0516) -0.3868*** (0.0775)    
orthodox -0.1639*** (0.0366) -0.2618*** (0.0617) -0.3796*** (0.0931)    
buddhist -0.1877*** (0.0379) -0.3066*** (0.0633) -0.4518*** (0.0954)    
hindu -0.01109384 -0.2051 (0.1596)    -0.3711** (0.1881)   
evangelical -0.2054*** (0.0477) -0.3238*** (0.0760) -0.4819*** (0.1241)    
otherrel -0.1058*** (0.0253) -0.1712*** (0.0421) -0.2427*** (0.0612)    
married 0.0258 (0.0179)    0.0476 (0.0301)    0.0625 (0.0451)    
 cohabite 0.0115 (0.0222)    0.0191 (0.0373)    0.0192 (0.0555)    
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divorced 0.0392 (0.0289)    0.0689 (0.0485)    0.0732 (0.0732)    
 separated -0.0026 (0.0381)    -0.0062 (0.0654)    -0.0303 (0.0952)    
 widowed -0.0865*** (0.0273) -0.1549*** (0.0464) -0.2266*** (0.0694)    
nochild 0.0214 (0.0165)    0.0375 (0.0278)    0.0652 (0.0416)    
 incprimary 0.0969*** (0.0258) 0.1676*** (0.0453) 0.1993*** (0.0631)   
primary 0.1678*** (0.0230) 0.3011*** (0.0405) 0.3689*** (0.0566)   
inctechnical 0.2175*** (0.0265) 0.3855*** (0.0460) 0.5001*** (0.0657)   
technical 0.2773*** (0.0235) 0.4718*** (0.0412) 0.6517*** (0.0574)   
incsecondary 0.2587*** (0.0286) 0.4481*** (0.0500) 0.6053*** (0.0709)   
secondary 0.2962*** (0.0237) 0.5128*** (0.0415) 0.7062*** (0.0574)   
someuniv 0.3912*** (0.0273) 0.6590*** (0.0471) 0.9882*** (0.0662)   
university 0.3662*** (0.0245) 0.6125*** (0.0426) 0.9299*** (0.0594)   
longterm 0.0332** (0.0133)    0.0487** (0.0224)    0.0785** (0.0334)    
 collectivism 0.0106 (0.0172)    0.0116 (0.0303)    -0.0125 (0.0409)    
 independence 0.0710*** (0.0100) 0.1092*** (0.0169) 0.1718*** (0.0250)   
masculinity -0.0432** (0.0197) -0.0867** (0.0354) -0.1224*** (0.0472)    
riskseeker 0.0817*** (0.0121) 0.1530*** (0.0208) 0.1735*** (0.0299)   
freedom 0.0244*** (0.0046) 0.0430*** (0.0077) 0.0855*** (0.0125)   
catcouncil 0.0541** (0.0227)    0.0762** (0.0379)    0.1477** (0.0576)    
 Catfreedom -0.0015 (0.0018)    -0.0007 (0.0029)    -0.0000369 
 Protfreedom -0.0038 (0.0025)    -0.0050 (0.0042)    -0.00007085 
 Evanfreedom -0.0059 (0.0043)    -0.0108 (0.0071)    -0.0222** (0.0113)   
Musfreedom -0.0260*** (0.0032) -0.0479*** (0.0056) -0.0741*** (0.0083)    
Hinfreedom -0.0073 (0.0076)    -0.0162 (0.0156)    -0.0171 (0.0175)    
 Budfreedom 0.0099*** (0.0034) 0.0196*** (0.0055) 0.0227** (0.0089)    
 Otherfreedom -0.0075*** (0.0027) -0.0107** (0.0046) -0.0227*** (0.0069)    
Nondenfreedom -0.0020 (0.0048)    -0.0014 (0.0082)    -0.0053 (0.0118)    
 Orthfreedom -0.0088*** (0.0025) -0.0150*** (0.0044) -0.0260*** (0.0065)    
N 60662 60662 60662 
 R-sq . . 0.21 
 pseudo Rsq 0.05 0.05 . 
 Sample weights suggested by the survey's authors have been used to ensure  national representativeness 
Country fixed effects included in all columns; Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 1: Stability of fatalism 
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Figure 2: Correlation between cosmological and structural fatalism 
italy
spain
usa
canada
japan
mexico
s africa
australiao w y
sweden
argentinafinland
s korea
poland
switzerland
brazil
chile
india
slovenia
bulgaria
romania
china
taiwan
turkeyukraine
peru
uruguay
ghana
moldova
georgia
thailand
indonesia
vietnam
serbia
egypt
morocco
iran
jordan
cypr
trinidad and tobago
andorra
malaysia
burkina faso
ethiopia
mali
rwanda
zambia
germany
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
In
d
e
x
 o
f 
s
tr
u
c
tu
ra
l 
fa
ta
lis
m
.6 .7 .8 .9 1
Index of cosmological fatalism
The index  are normalized dividing them  by their respective sample maximum
(pwcorr.:0.68;sig.:0.000)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25 
References 
 
Acevedo, G. A. (2005). "Turning Anomie on Its Head: Fatalism as Durkheim's Concealed and 
Multidimensional Alienation Theory", Sociological Theory ,23:75-85 
Alesina, A. Angeletos,G. M. (2005).  "Fairness and Redistribution,"American Economic Review,  
95(3): 960-980. 
Benabou, R., Tirole, J. (2006). "Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 121(2):699-746. 
Caliendo, M., Cobb-Clark, D. & Uhlendorff, A. (2010). "Locus of Control and Job Search Strategies." 
IZA Discussion Paper, NO 4750, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Church, A. T. (2000). "Culture and Personality: Toward an Integrated Cultural Trait Psychology", 
Journal of Personality, 68(4): 651-703. 
Croce, B. (1942). "Perchè non possiamo non dirci cristiani", La Critica, pp.289-297. 
Cunha, F., and Heckman J. (2007). "The Technology of Skill Formation", American Economic 
Review, 97(2): 31-47. 
D'Orlando, F. Ferrante, F. & Ruiu, G. (2011) . "Culturally based beliefs and labor market institutions", 
The Journal of Socio-Economics, 40 :150-162. 
Durkheim, E. (1951). Suicide, translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson, Glencoe, Ill.: 
republished by Free Press, 1951 
Eisenstadt, S. N., 1968, The Protestant Ethic and Modernization: A Comparative View. New York, 
Basic Books. 
Finer, S., (1997). The History of Government, Vol. III.. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge,U.K.. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures, Basic Books, New York, NY. 
Gorodnichenko, Y., Roland, G., (2010). "Culture, Institutions and the Wealth of Nations", ", IZA 
discussion Papers  No. 5187, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Greif, A. (1994). "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical 
Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies", Journal of Political Economy 102:  912-950. 
Guiso, L., Rustichini, A. (2011), "What Drives Women Out of Entrepreneurship? The Joint Role of 
Testosterone and Culture.", CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8204. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. &  Zingales, L. (2009). "Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 124(3), 1095-1131. 
----------------- (2003). "People's Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes.",Journal of Monetary 
Economics, 50: 225-282. 
----------------- (2006). "Does Culture affect Economic Outcome?" Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
20(2): 23-48. 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values. Beverly 
Hills, CA: Sage. 
----------------- (1991). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. London, McGraw-Hill. 
----------------- (1994). "The Business of International Business is Culture", International Business 
Review, Vol. 3 (1): 1-14. 
----------------- (1997), Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind, McGraw-Hill, New 
York,NY. 
Hofstede, G., McCrae, R.R. (2004). "Personality and Culture Revisited: Linking Traits and 
Dimensions of Culture", Cross-Cultural Research, 38(1): 52-88. 
Huntington, S. P. (1993). "The Clash of Civilizations.", Foreign Affairs, 72:22-50. 
Huntington, S. P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New 
York:Touchstone. 
Inglehart, R., Baker,W. E. (2000). "Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional 
values", American Sociological Review, 65:19-51. 
Landes, D., (1998). The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, London: Little, Brown, and Company. 
Lerner, M. J. (1982). The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion. New York, NY: Plenum 
 26 
Press. 
McClure, J. L., Walkey, F. H., & Allen, M. (1999). When earthquake damage is seen as preventable: 
Attributions, locus of control, and attitudes to risk. Applied Psychology: an International Review, 48, 
239-256. 
McClure, J., Allen, M. W. &Walkey, F. (2001). "Countering Fatalism: Causal Information in News 
Reports",  Basic and Applied Social Psychology,  23(2) 109-121. 
McClure, J., Sutton, R. M., & Sibley, C. (2007). "Listening to reporters or engineers: How different 
messages about building design affect earthquake fatalism",  Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 
37, 1956-1973. 
McCracken, G. (1988), Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic Character of 
Consumer Goods and Activities, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN. 
McGee,A. (2010).  "How the Perception of Control Influences Unemployed Job Search", Not 
published, Job market paper.  
Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, Ma, Harvard University Press. 
Nelson, K., Geiger, A.M., Mangione, C.M. (2002). "Effect of Health Beliefs on Delays in Care for 
Abnormal Cervical Cytology in a Multiethnic Population", Journal of General Internal Medicine, 
17(9), pp. 709-716. 
Niederpeppe, J., Gurmankin Levy, A., (2007). "Fatalistic Beliefs about Cancer Prevention and Three 
Prevention Behaviors", Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers & Prevention, 16(5), pp. 998-1003. 
North, D. C. , (1994), "Economic Performance Through Time", American Economic Review, 84:359-
368. 
Perilla, J.L. , Norris, F.H & Lavizzo, E. A. (2002). "Ethnicity, Culture, and Disaster Response: 
identifying and explaining ethnic differences in PTSD six months after hurricane", Journal of Social 
and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2002, pp. 20-45. 
Roland, G. (2004). "Understanding Institutional Change: Fast-moving and Slow-moving Institutions." 
Studies in Comparative International Development, 38: 109-131. 
Rook, D.W. (1985), "The ritual dimension of consumer behavior'", Journal of Consumer Research, 
Vol. 12, December: 251-64. 
Rotter, J. B. (1966). "Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of 
Reinforcement." Psychological Monographs, 80(1): 1-28. 
Rotter, J. B. (1990). "Internal versus external control of reinforcement: A case history of a variable", 
American Psychologist, 45:489-493. 
Ruiu (2012). The role of culture and institutions in entrepreneurial selection, Ph. D. dissertation, 
University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale, Mimeo. 
Schotter, Andrew. The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
1981. 
Schwartz, S. H., Bardi, A., Bianchi, G., (2000). Value Adaptation to the Imposition and Collapse of 
Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe, in Renshon, Stanley A. and Duckitt, John, eds., Political 
psychology: Cultural and Cross-Cultural Foundations, Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Shapiro, J., Wu, S. (2010). "Fatalism and Savings",  MPRA Paper No 24852, University Library of 
Munich, Germany. 
Straughan, P.T., Seow, A, (1998). "Fatalism Reconceptualized: A Concept to Predict Health 
Screening Behavior", Journal of Gender, Culture, and Health, 3(2), pp. 85-100. 
Tabellini, G. (2010). "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe", 
Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(4):677-716. 
Thébaud, S. (2010). "Gender and Entrepreneurship as a Career Choice: Do Self-assessments of 
Ability Matter?",  Social Psychology Quarterly, 73(3): 288-304. 
Thomas, A. S., Mueller, S. A., (2000). "A Case for Comparative Entrepreneurship: Assessing the 
Relevance of Culture", Journal of International Business Studies, 31(2):287-301. 
Verheul, I., Wennekers, S., Audretsch, D. & Thurik, R. (2002). "An eclectic theory of 
entrepreneurship: Policies, Institutions and Culture", Economics of Science, Technology and 
Innovation, 27: 11-81, 
 27 
Weber, M. (1930) The Protestant Ethic and the spirit of capitalism, London: Georg Allen &Unwin. 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY 2005 OFFICIAL DATA FILE v.20090901, 2009. World Values 
Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid. 
Wu, S. (2005)."Fatalistic Tendencies: An Explanation of Why People Don't Save", Contributions to 
Economic Analysis & Policy, http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol4/iss1/art1 
 
